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Textuality and
the Ends of Modernity

Hugh J. Silverman

History reveals its "ironic" essence:
interpretation and distortion, or
dis-location, characterize not only
the relation of thought to the messages of the past but also the relation of one "epoch" to the others
G. Vattimo, TheEnd of Modernity (180)
Review-essay on Gianni Vattimo, The End of Modernity. Trans. and with an
introduction by Jon R. Snyder. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989.
1. INTRODUCTION

While Gianni Vattimo does not embark upon the theme of
weak thought [il pensiero debole]in his 1985 Fine della Modernita
(now available in English), the context for his account of nonfoundational thinking is carefully set. Indeed, The End of Modernity can
be regarded as a backdrop for this aspect of postmodernism that
is now quite generally associated with Vattimo in Italy and increasingly in the English-speaking world as well. "Weak thought" is
a kind of thinking that is set off against "strong thought"-rigid,
prestructured, grounded, foundational thought. Il pensierodebole
operates at the limits of those teleological, eschatological,
metaphysical, and even transcendental modes of cognition that
have become the groundworks of modernity. Il pensierodeboleoffers
an ironized alternative and yet not a counterpoint to "strong
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thought." "Weak thought" moves "strong thought" to its limits,
delimits it, but does not substitute for it. Pensierodebateis "strong
thought" radicalized, taken to its extremes, undermined by its
own self-delimitations.
What one finds in The End of Modernity is a fully articulated
reading of how Nietzsche and Heidegger-but
also on occasion
Adorno and Benjamin-account
for a modernity that sets limits
to the epochal notion itself . Modernity is identified, circumscribed,
and enframed by the positions that Nietzsche and Heidegger announce. Like Nietzsche's "Madman" (proclaiming the death of
God in the Gay Science)or like Heidegger's Rilke (announcing an
end to the destitute time that his Holderlin had already identified
earlier in "Wozu Dichter?"),Vattimo's reading delineates the traces
of modernity, setting a frame to itself. Thus the task of a reading
of the end of modernity will necessitate an account of modernity
and the Verwindung that affirms its self-circumscription. That the
self-circumscription is developed in terms of Heidegger's notion
of Ge-stellwill require greater elaboration, and the function of this
Ge-stellas setting the frame for a theoretical practice of textuality
will have to be put to the test of even further scrutiny.
2. MODERNITY

What does Vattimo mean by modernity and why does he
eschew the term "modernism"? Modernity is that acceptance of
a concept of the new, of progress, of the individual mind or subject
which exhibits its uniqueness in science, art, and religion. Modernity is reassuring, constructive, hopeful, meaning-laden, and reality-referring. When modernity is represented in novels such as
those of Joyce, Woolf, and Kafka, its constitution is always with
a view to showing how things are-as well as to what is shown in the
showing . With modernity, there is an "outside," "external" world
which is "out there" waiting to be described. With modernity,
subjectivity constitutes itself as the other-other
than objectivity
and often other than itself . Alterity, alienation, self-objectification
-these features of modernity abound in modern philosophy, literature, and science.
Modernism, in contrast to modernity, is a school of thought
and artistic practice that goes beyond romanticism, realism,
naturalism in favor of a futurist, cubist, stream of consciousness
style of writing, painting, thinking. Modernism is the cult of the
"new"; modernism goes in search of the shocking and the forwardlooking; modernism is the very discovery of the twentieth century .
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Modernity, however, is a way of being that constitutes itself
over against the classical and the traditional. To be modem is to
be something special, but also to be thoroughly ordinary at the
same time. "Modem Times"-as the Charlie Chaplin film came
to identify it-is the affirmation of a world in which the subject
seeks to affirm itself over against the ordinary, mundane, and
habitual.
So what would it mean for Gianni Vattimo to speak of the
"end of modernity"? Modem thought has, for a long time, understood its own limitations. Modem thought-in the grand tradition,
a tradition that affirms the position of the subject as founded,
grounded, and central by virtue of its constituting activities-seeks
to delineate and delimit that to which it has access.
As an empiricism, modem thought was bound to what it
could experience directly, without mediation, or resolve. As a
rationalism, it reached out to that which can be provided by
reason, clarity and distinctness, certainty and justification. At the
same time that Vico found limits to the "modem," Cartesian way
of thinking (asserting a "new" science-and hence another modernism), he also sought after the "true Homer" through the agency
of a rhetoric of poetic wisdom. Poetic wisdom would get out of
the limits that Cartesian subjectivity circumscribed for itself.
Even though Hegel brought subjectivity back into the context
of a search for Absolute Mind, Hegelian thought nevertheless
incorporates a magnificent rhetoric that brings together the contradictions of subjectivity and objectivity into an all-encompassing
story. While Hegel's history moves in stages-as does Vico's-his
orientation is toward a greater inclusion. What Hegel missed was
the doubling of the transcendental and the empirical that Kant
(in the eighteenth century) founded and that Husserl (in the twentieth) rediscovered. Nevertheless, Hegel was extremely conscious
of the ends of philosophical activity. "End" in this sense could
only mean "achievement," "accomplishment," "fulfillment"-a
bringing to completion of that which had been started at some
moment in time, but which could still realize itself in philosophical
practices that reiterated, repeated, and reaffirmed all that Absolute
Thought had accomplished.
3. THE END OF MODERNITY

The "end of modemity"-as
Vattimo articulates it-can come
only after a crisis. Husserl's" crisis of the European sciences" in the
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1930s brought the recognition that the whole Cartesian-Kantianand even Husserlian-program
could not go on forever.
What Vico-Hegel, and later Foucault, were able to show was
that modernity has inscribed within it the very limitation to its
own success. The Vico-Hegel-Foucault complex is well aware that
modern thought cannot be understood apart from narrative, poetics, and historicality. But the poetics of human history are necessarily interrupted at various stages-or
what Vattimo calls
"epochs." The Vico-Hegel-Foucault account remarks on the
breaks, discontinuities, and thresholds that mark off the ages of
human history. In this sense, however, it affirms many "ends,"
many places of termination, many moments of conclusion and
reformation
The Deleuzean rhizomatic exuberance and the Derridean dissemination unmark any particular end as "the end." They distribute unevenly the multiplicity of ends into a variety of contexts,
formulations, and discursive practices. They read "end" in many
texts-all circumscribing the text of modernity. And these "ends"
indicate places where "something new" will come to replacethe
old, succeed the old, give new identity to the difference that has
inscribed itself at the end of a framework. But what they replace
is not a rejection of the former, not a discarding of the old, not a
new beginning, but rather a reinscription back into the old as that
which is radically other than the old.
4. THE INSCRIPTION OF DIFFERENCES

Somewhere between Nietzsche and Heidegger, and somewhere between the Vico-Hegel-Foucault complex on the one hand
and the Descartes-Kant-Husserl lineage on the other, Vattimo
inscribes the "end of modernity" thesis. The Descartes-Kant-Husserl genealogy identifies modernity with the subject-object
dualism that eventually takes the shape of what Foucault calls an
"empirico-transcendental
doublet." The Vico-Hegel-Foucault
complex finds that modernity only enters the scene in the
eighteenth century-with Vico himself, with Kant. But the beginning of modernity carries with it its very end.
The frame of modernity is outlined and predetermined along
with its very inception. Hence Vattimo's reading of Nietzsche is
one that stresses the genealogical, epochal, and markedly colorful
character of the modernist achievement. While the epochal colors
are somewhat somber, patterned at twilight and sunset,
Nietzsche's Zarathustra is often cognizant of brilliance and light.
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Similarly-and in a moment of repetition-the
movement of modernist Italian futurism and De Chirico's colorful shapes provide
an image of Nietzschean modernity. And while the Schopenhauerian pessimism of an Edvard Munch and the social critique of a
Max Beckmann are another side of the Nietzschean panorama,
they are only that part that necessitates the call to the end of
modernity .
The facets of modernity near its end are multiform and manyhued. Their display and distribution are their surfaces and dissemination . Between Nietzsche and Foucault, the moments of
critique mark off the writing of difference as the Being of beings,
as the ontological difference. Between them, end acquires an identity of its own, and that identity is "difference ."
The Nietzschean appeal to a "revaluation of values" is the
proclamation of an end, an epochal end, an end to which any
successful Ubermensch would have to be committed. Following
Nietzsche's "death of God" proclamation, Foucault's picture of the
"death of man" is perhaps only a displaced repetition. And yet
both narratives are part of the inscription of the end of modernity.
What Vattimo inserts in between the Nietzsche/Foucault picture
is the moment of Heidegger's Verwindung. For Vattimo, the inscribed moment is not so much an "overcoming" (Uberwindung)as Nietzsche might insist-though
this is also part of Heidegger's
story, but a "getting over" modernity (a Verwindung of modernity) .
Modernity is like a wound that can be healed, a sickness that can
be cured, an experience that can be brought to a conclusion.
Heidegger's "overcoming" of metaphysics, his claims to the "end"
of philosophy, and his assertions concerning the achievements of
European nihilism all mark off the place where thinking needs to
occur .
Heidegger's Denken will have to operate at the end of
metaphysics. Out of the forgetfulness-(Seins)Vergessenheit-that
accompanies the preoccupation with the ontic, Heidegger calls
for a reinscription of the meaning of the Being of beings, namely,
the ontological difference in which thinking inscribes itself. Denken
names, calls, invokes the meaning of the Being of beings out of
forgetfulness. Heideggerian Denken is both a return to the hitherto
unthought and an end to the metaphysics that is devoid of thinking. Heideggerian Denken operates in a differential spa ce. It is not
comfortable with identities . Heideggerian Denken can only come
into its own in the event of difference. Ereignis-which Vattimo
discusses at length-is the event of appropriation, the happening
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of what is ownmost in the ontological difference. Ontological
difference-the
meaning of the Being of beings-marks
out an
open space in which Ereignis comes into its own. Ereignis is the
happening of difference, the event of difference, the appropriation
of difference. And in that space of difference Denken takes place.
Vattimo's pensierodeboleoperates at the end of modernity, at
that place of difference where a revaluation of values marks off
the happening of Ereignis, where Denken becomes pensierodebole.
Heideggerian Denken operates within a frame. Heidegger calls this
frame the Ge-stell. The Ge-stellcomes under many descriptions. It
is sometimes called "a framework," as in the structure of something; sometimes it is a bodily form which gives shape to what it
shapes; sometimes it is "technology," the forging into shape of
that which would otherwise be shapeless; and sometimes it is a
frame, as in a frame of a painting. For Heidegger, Denken cannot
occur outside a frame, framework, or shape. Yet it also cannot be
the determination of the content of what is framed. Denkenrequires
difference, and difference needs to be enframed (as Ge-stell) in
order for it to take shape.
For Vattimo, the Ge-stellmarks off modernity, inscribes difference within the frames of modernity. For Vattimo, Denkenoperates
in the event of difference, in the Ereignis of the ontological difference where there is silence, where the call of Being can be heard, but
heard without sound. This hearing without sound is the hermeneutic
Verstehenthat both Heidegger and Gadamer extoll. Verstehen-hermeneutic understanding---occurs where difference is set by the Gestell. And the Ge-stellmarks off where the event of the meaning of
the Being of beings happens.
The Ge-stell is also where poetizing can occur-perhaps
the
other end of the poetizing that Vico had prophetically inscribed in
his "new science." This poetizing is where modernity is brought to
its ultimate achievement. As Vattimo points out, the achievement
of poetizing is not an "overcoming" of modernity, but rather a
Venvindung of modernity-Heideggerian
poetizing is what happens
in the ontological difference.
In setting its own limits, in marking off its margins, in textualizing itself, modernity, in the sense that it has come to fulfill for itself,
is brought to its limits, brought to its end. Its foundations are shown
to be foundations within a context, within a frame. At the ends of
modernity, foundations are dislocated and displaced. Vattimo's idea
of a postfoundational thinking-a pensierodebole---operatesat the
limits of those founded activities that reaffirm the modern. Where
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Heidegger notes a falling away from the ground (the Grund), where
he indicates an Abgrund, an abyss, there Vattimo becomes aware of
the adventures of difference, there pensierodebolecomes into its own,
circumscribing, marking off, enframing, setting a Ge-stellfor the
Venvindung, the self-delimitation of modernity .

